EDITORIAL: Police: A Necessary Reform That Must Not Become A Governor’s Private Army

Nigeria’s long-running debate over the establishment of state police appears to be approaching a decisive moment, with encouraging progress in the constitutional amendment process raising hopes that the country may soon begin a fundamental restructuring of its policing architecture. The reported approval of the proposed reform by 24 state assemblies, meeting the constitutionally required two-thirds threshold of the 36 states, represents a significant milestone in a country grappling with persistent insecurity, overstretched security agencies and the limitations of a highly centralised policing system.

For a nation confronted by terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence, armed robbery and other forms of criminality, the prospect of bringing policing closer to the communities it serves is compelling. State police could improve intelligence gathering, shorten response times, strengthen community engagement and enable security agencies to understand the peculiarities of the territories in which they operate. Yet, while the prospect of this reform deserves encouragement, its implementation must be approached with a clear understanding that decentralising police authority does not automatically guarantee better policing.

The central question is not simply whether Nigeria should establish state police. It is whether the country can design and operate a decentralised policing system that protects citizens, respects constitutional rights, upholds professional standards and remains independent of the political ambitions of state governors.

As the proposed constitutional amendment advances towards the remaining legislative stages and eventual presidential assent, the country must recognise that the success of state police will depend as much on the safeguards built into the system as on the decision to establish it.

A Historic Opportunity To Reform Policing

Nigeria’s security challenges have exposed the limitations of relying predominantly on a centrally controlled police force to serve a vast and diverse federation. The Nigeria Police Force is expected to maintain law and order across states with different geographical conditions, social structures, criminal patterns and security priorities. From remote communities threatened by banditry to densely populated urban centres battling organised crime, the demands on the institution are enormous.

The federal police structure has also struggled with inadequate personnel, insufficient equipment, funding constraints, logistical difficulties and the challenge of responding effectively to emergencies in distant locations. These difficulties should not be interpreted as a failure of individual police officers, many of whom work under demanding conditions, but as evidence that Nigeria’s security architecture requires institutional strengthening.

A state police system could provide an additional layer of capacity by allowing states to recruit, train, equip and deploy officers with a better understanding of local circumstances. State governments would have greater responsibility for addressing security threats within their jurisdictions, while the federal police would retain responsibility for national policing functions and matters requiring coordination across state boundaries.

The potential advantages are considerable. Local officers may be better positioned to identify suspicious activities, cultivate relationships with residents, understand local languages and customs, and develop reliable intelligence about emerging threats. They could also help bridge the gap between communities and security institutions that has sometimes undermined public confidence.

However, local knowledge alone does not guarantee professional conduct. A police officer who understands a community can serve it more effectively, but that same familiarity could be exploited for political intimidation, ethnic discrimination or personal vendettas if the system lacks adequate controls.

State police must therefore be established as a public institution serving the law, rather than as an extension of the political establishment.

The Constitutional Threshold Is Not The End Of The Journey

The reported approval of the proposal by 24 state assemblies is an encouraging development because it indicates that the constitutional threshold has been reached. It reflects growing recognition among state legislators that the existing policing arrangement deserves serious reconsideration.

Nevertheless, meeting the two-thirds requirement is a constitutional milestone, not an excuse to rush the remaining stages of the amendment process. The relevant legislative resolutions, the National Assembly’s requirements and the formal constitutional procedures must be satisfied before the amendment can take effect. Presidential assent, where constitutionally required under the applicable amendment process, must follow the proper legislative steps

The distinction is important. State police is too consequential a reform to be reduced to a political announcement or treated as an administrative adjustment that can be implemented without a carefully prepared legal framework.

The Constitution must clearly define the respective responsibilities of federal and state police institutions, their command structures, their territorial jurisdictions and the mechanisms for resolving disputes between them. It must also establish how officers will be recruited, trained, disciplined and held accountable.

There must be no ambiguity about who investigates crimes involving state officials, who responds when political interests conflict with public safety, or which authority intervenes when a state police command is accused of violating citizens’ rights.

These questions must be answered before the system becomes fully operational, not after avoidable abuses have occurred.

The Greatest Danger: A Governor’s Private Police Force

The most serious concern surrounding state police is the possibility that governors could turn the new institutions into personal instruments of political control.

In Nigeria’s political environment, where competition for power can be intense and state resources are sometimes deployed for partisan purposes, the concentration of policing authority in the hands of a governor presents a genuine risk. A state police command could become an intimidating force against opposition parties, independent-minded politicians, critical journalists, civil society organisations and ordinary citizens who question the government.

Such an outcome would betray the very purpose of the reform.

State police must not become an instrument for harassing political opponents, disrupting lawful opposition rallies, arresting critics on questionable grounds or preventing citizens from exercising their constitutional rights. Nor should it be used to protect politically connected individuals from investigation or to settle disputes arising from party primaries, electoral contests and rivalries within the ruling establishment.

The danger is not imaginary merely because the reform has popular support. Institutions must be designed around the possibility of abuse, particularly when they exercise powers that can deprive citizens of liberty or expose them to intimidation.

A governor is an elected political leader, not the owner of the state. Public security institutions exist to protect every resident, regardless of political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, social status or personal relationship with those in power.

Consequently, the governor’s authority over state police must be defined and limited by law. The governor may have legitimate responsibilities for setting broad security priorities, coordinating public safety policy and ensuring that the state provides adequate funding. However, these responsibilities must not translate into unrestricted power to dictate arrests, determine the outcome of investigations or direct officers to act against political adversaries.

Operational independence is indispensable. Professional police commanders must be able to investigate allegations impartially, even when the suspects are influential members of the government or its political allies.

Where a governor is implicated in an offence, the system must provide a credible mechanism through which the investigation can proceed without interference. The same principle must apply when allegations involve commissioners, legislators, local government officials or members of the governor’s political party.

Without these protections, state police could merely decentralise the problems of abuse of authority rather than solve them.

Independent Oversight Must Be Built Into The System

The country must not assume that the existence of a state police service will automatically produce accountability. A well-designed institution needs independent oversight, transparent procedures and enforceable sanctions for misconduct.

State police commissions or equivalent independent statutory bodies should be established with clearly defined responsibilities for appointments, promotions, discipline and complaints. Their membership must not be dominated by the governor or political appointees whose positions depend entirely on the executive.

The composition of these bodies should provide room for credible representatives of the judiciary, legal profession, human rights institutions, community organisations and other relevant stakeholders, subject to constitutional arrangements and appropriate safeguards against conflicts of interest.

Legislatures must also exercise meaningful oversight over state police expenditure, recruitment, operational priorities and reported abuses. Such oversight should not become an opportunity for politicians to interfere in individual investigations, but it must provide a channel for scrutinising the conduct of the institution.

Citizens must have accessible avenues for reporting police misconduct. Complaints of unlawful arrest, torture, extortion, excessive use of force, unlawful detention and political intimidation should receive prompt and impartial investigation. Victims must be able to obtain remedies, while officers found culpable should face appropriate sanctions.

Equally important, police budgets and procurement processes must be transparent enough to discourage corruption and the diversion of public funds. State police must not become another avenue for patronage, inflated contracts or the recruitment of party loyalists under the guise of security appointments.

The independence of the judiciary must remain sacrosanct. Courts must be able to review unlawful police actions and protect citizens against arbitrary detention and other violations of their rights.

Recruitment Must Be Based On Merit, Not Political Loyalty

Another potential weakness is the danger of turning recruitment into a political reward system. If state police appointments are distributed according to party affiliation, personal connections or loyalty to the governor, the institution will struggle to command public confidence.

Recruitment must be competitive, transparent and based on demonstrable competence, integrity, physical fitness and suitability for police work. Background checks must be rigorous, while training must cover criminal investigation, evidence handling, human rights, conflict management, intelligence gathering, community relations and the lawful use of force.

Officers must also understand that their primary loyalty is to the Constitution and the law, not to the governor who appointed them or the administration that funds their operations.

This principle should be reinforced through professional codes of conduct, continuous training and disciplinary systems capable of addressing violations without political interference.

Nigeria must also guard against the possibility that state police commands could reflect ethnic or religious prejudices in recruitment and deployment. Every resident must be entitled to equal protection, while appointments should be sufficiently inclusive to promote confidence among communities within each state.

A state police service that alienates minority groups or discriminates against people because of their origins will deepen social divisions and undermine security.

Funding And Professional Capacity Will Determine Success

The establishment of state police will impose significant financial obligations on state governments. Recruitment, training, salaries, pensions, communication systems, vehicles, forensic facilities, intelligence infrastructure and modern investigative equipment all require sustained funding.

Governors must therefore resist the temptation to announce the creation of police commands without providing the resources necessary for effective and professional operations

States already face competing demands involving education, healthcare, infrastructure, social protection and economic development. State police expenditure must be planned realistically to avoid creating poorly equipped institutions that consume public money without delivering meaningful security improvements.

The funding model must also protect operational integrity. Officers whose salaries are delayed, whose equipment is inadequate or whose welfare is neglected may become vulnerable to corruption, extortion and improper influence.

Adequate funding should be accompanied by transparent financial controls, independent audits and clear performance indicators. States must be able to demonstrate that additional expenditure is translating into improved response times, better investigations, stronger public confidence and reduced criminal activity.

There should also be national minimum standards for training, equipment, human rights compliance and professional conduct. Decentralisation must not result in a situation where the quality of policing depends entirely on the wealth of the state in which a citizen resides.

The federal government should support the development of common professional standards, intelligence-sharing arrangements and training frameworks without using those responsibilities to undermine legitimate state policing functions.

Coordination Between Federal And State Police Is Essential

Nigeria cannot afford a policing structure in which federal and state agencies compete for influence, conceal intelligence or obstruct one another’s operations. Criminal networks do not always respect state boundaries. Kidnappers may move victims across jurisdictions, armed groups may operate in several states, and organised criminal enterprises may maintain networks extending throughout the country.

Effective state police must therefore operate within a coordinated national security framework. Clear protocols are required for joint operations, information sharing, cross-border investigations, access to forensic resources and the transfer of suspects in accordance with the law.

The respective mandates of federal and state police must be carefully defined to prevent jurisdictional disputes from delaying responses to emergencies or allowing offenders to escape accountability.

A credible system should also provide procedures for investigating allegations that one police command has abused its powers or obstructed a legitimate investigation by another. Such arrangements must be governed by law rather than personal relationships between governors, police commissioners and federal security officials.

Where states cooperate effectively, the result could be a stronger security network in which local knowledge complements national intelligence and operational capacity.

Where they fail to cooperate, the system could become fragmented, expensive and vulnerable to exploitation by criminal groups.

The Reform Must Serve The Citizen, Not The Political Class

Ultimately, the justification for state police must be measured by the security and freedom it delivers to ordinary Nigerians. Farmers should be able to cultivate their land without fear of attacks. Traders should travel and conduct business without constant anxiety about kidnapping and robbery. Communities should receive timely assistance when threatened, while residents must be able to report crimes without fear that their complaints will be ignored because the accused person has political connections.

The measure of success must not be the number of state police commands established, the quantity of vehicles procured or the size of the security budgets announced at official ceremonies. It must be whether citizens are safer, criminal investigations are more effective, public trust is strengthened and police officers operate within the law.

State police must not become a tool for suppressing political dissent, manipulating elections or intimidating communities into silence. The right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, lawful political participation and access to justice must remain protected under every policing arrangement.

The National Assembly and state assemblies must therefore ensure that the legal framework contains enforceable protections against political interference. Civil society organisations, the media, professional associations and citizens must remain vigilant in scrutinising the design and implementation of the reform.

Governors, for their part, must demonstrate statesmanship by recognising that the police are not an extension of their political machinery. A governor who uses the police to intimidate opponents may gain a temporary advantage, but the long-term consequence will be institutional distrust and a weakened democratic culture.

A Reform Worth Supporting, But Not Without Safeguards

Nigeria has an opportunity to make its policing system more responsive to local realities and better equipped to confront the country’s diverse security challenges. The reported endorsement of the constitutional amendment by 24 state assemblies is a significant step towards that objective, and the prospect of further approvals reinforces the momentum behind the reform.

However, the country must resist the assumption that the establishment of state police will, by itself, resolve insecurity. The reform can succeed only if it is accompanied by professional training, adequate funding, effective coordination, independent oversight and an unwavering commitment to constitutional rights.

As the process moves towards its final stages, the warning must be unmistakable: state police must never become a governor’s private army.

The institution must be protected against political capture, ethnic manipulation, corruption and arbitrary exercises of power. Its officers must serve the public, not the ambitions of the politicians who control state administrations.

The President and the lawmakers responsible for completing the constitutional process must recognise that they are not merely creating another security institution. They are helping to shape a system that could determine the relationship between the Nigerian state and its citizens for generations.

If properly designed and responsibly implemented, state police could strengthen public safety, deepen federalism and restore confidence in the capacity of government to protect lives and property. If poorly designed, it could multiply the centres of abuse, create competing instruments of political coercion and undermine the democratic freedoms the reform is supposed to protect.

Nigeria should therefore welcome the progress made, but it must insist on safeguards before celebrating the destination. The objective is not simply to bring policing closer to the states; it is to bring effective, accountable and impartial policing closer to the people.

That is the promise state police must fulfil. Anything less would amount to a costly reform whose original purpose had been betrayed.